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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
COMMON LAW MARRIAGES IN WISCONSIN
The flagrant disregard, by the disciples of the many new
"cults" and followers of the modernm "isms," evidenced by the sa-
lacious headline stories of the yellow journals, to eradicate the
traditional sex relation and God-endowed status of matrimony for
a much freer relation,' and by the ever increasing number of
divorces,2 brings up forcibly the question of the Common Law
Marriage in Wisconsin. All the authorities agree that during
historical times promiscuity has been either non-existent or con-
fined to a few small groups.3 However, some writers have as-
serted that sex relations must at some time in the far distant past
have differed but slightly from the corresponding usages among
the brutes.'
It is not, of course, impossible that among some peoples inter-
course between the sexes may have been almost promiscuous.
But there is not a shred of genuine evidence for the nation that
promiscuity ever formed a general stage in the history of man-
kind, although polygamy occurs among some people and polyandry
among others. Monogamy is by far the most common form of
human marriage. The experience of the race, in its evolutionary
cycle toward civilization, has approved of monogamy for the
simple reason that monogamy is in harmony with the essential
and immutable elements of human nature. Taking the word
natural in its full and basic sense, we may unhesitatingly affirm
that monogamy is the only natural form of marriage. Nature's
laws work impartial justice upon the ignorant and the knowing,
the guilty and the innocent, the rich and the poor. Our courts and
our laws seek to prevent promiscuity and polygamy, and to punish
for seduction and adultery. The sanctity of the home must neces-
sarily be preserved to endow one's government and people with
the longevity essential to prosperity and happiness. Our legisla-
tive and judiciary will go far in preserving that sanctity.
From a moral and canonical aspect, marriage is said to be a
contract, which, by its very nature, is above human law. It was
instituted by God, is subject to divine law, and cannot, for that
reason, be rescinded by human law. Some of the religious sects
'Bebel: Women under Socialism, translated from the German by Daniel
De Leon.
'U. S. Census Report i887-i9o6, and supplementary report for x916.
'Howard: History of Matrimonial Institutions, Vol. i, p. go.
'Giddings: Principles of Sociology, p. 208.
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have raised the institution of marriage to the dignity and grace of
a sacrament.
Section 2328 of our statutes provided "that marriage so far as
its validity in law is concerned is a civil contract, to which the
consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is essential."
While this is the legislative definition of marriage, yet, in the eyes
of the municipal law, it is not a contract, strictly speaking, but is a
status resulting from the contract to marry. Justice Story speaks
of it as "an institution of society founded upon the contract and
consent of the parties." The law does not permit it to be a subject
of experiment or temporary arrangement, but a fixed and perma-
nent status to be dissolved only by death, or, where statutes
permit, by divorce. It is this irrevocability and permanency
that contradistinguishes the marriage contract from the simple
civil contract. If it would be considered but a contract, then the
legislature would be powerless to amend the law of marriage, as it
would be within the prohibition of the constitution against the
impairing of contracts by state legislation.5
By the Common Law, as it was understood in England at the
time of the colonization of the United States, and as it was de-
clared and adopted by the American Courts, no ceremony was
necessary-no declaration of the marriage-that is, by a magis-
trate or minister, or, even in the presence of such magistrate or
minister. The parties need only exchange declarations of their
present agreement to enter into the marriage relations.
The old maxim is: Consenus, non-concubitus, facit nuptias; and
the rule became formulated as follows: Consent per verba de
praesenti, with or without consummation, constitutes a Common
Law marriage; or consent per verba de futuro, followed by con-
summation. The first part of this formula has lately received
careful examination and criticism, and it has been held that verba
de praesenti do not constitute a marriage unless followed by co-
habitation, and the second formula, although used by many text
writers, is not the law for if an agreement for future marriage
followed by cohabitation is a valid marriage, then every case of
seduction under promise of marriage would be a legal marriage in
fact.
The latest Wisconsin case, Becker v. Becker, 153 Wis. 226,
decided April 8, '913, states the Wisconsin rule, as it was at the
'Maynard v. Hill, 25 U. S. i9o.
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time, as follows: "An oral promise of marriage made between
competent parties per verba de praesenti, although without witness
or ceremony of any kind, if consummated by cohabitation and cor-
roborated by holding themselves out to the public as husband and
wife, is a valid and binding marriage."
At that time our statutes required certain directions respecting
the formation and solemnization, 6 prescribing that it be solemnized
in a particular manner before certain authorized persons, under
a license, and imposed penalties for non-observance. The court,
however, construed these provisions as directory only, and held
that the marriage was valid.
The Supreme Court of the United States, 7 prior thereto, had
held that a marriage valid at Common Law is valid, notwithstand-
ing the statutes of the state where it is contracted, which prescribe
directions respecting its formation, unless the statutes contain
express words of nullity.
'The Becker case was decided in April 1913, but in the session of
the 1917 legislature, Chapter 218 of the Laws of 1917 was passed,
which, as yet, has not received judicial construction. Section 3
thereof, being section 2339n-21 provides: "All marriages hereafter
contracted in violation of any of the requirements of sections
2339n-I shall be null and void."
Thus our legislature has now placed into our statutes "express
words of nullity" when the provisions, respecting the formation
and solemnization, be not followed. They have taken those regu-
lating statutes out of the "directory" class and made them "man-
datory." The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the Becker case,
by way of dicta, intimated that they would not recognize a
Common Law marriage, if such marriage, in disregard of the
provisions respecting the formation and solemnization, were de-
clared expressly by the statute to be void.
From the above, one must be forced to the conclusion that all
Common Law marriages in Wisconsin since 1917 are no longer
recognized, and our Supreme Court should so hold in their efforts
to check modem liberalism.
J. A. C. LIGHTNER, '22.
'Section 2339n-i to 2339n-27.
'Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76.
